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CRIMINAL LAW-THEFT OF USE OF COMPUTER
v. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. App. Ct. 1984).
I.

SERVIcE~tate

INTRODUCTION

With the current profusion of computers in our society, the state
of the law concerning the theft of computer time and services becomes
increasingly important. Recently, the Indiana State Court of Appeals
Second District faced the issue in State v. McGraw. 1 In McGraw, the
court considered whether the unauthorized use of computer services
constituted theft as a matter of law under the Indiana statute. 2 The
court held that a theft had occurred. 3
A jury found Michael McGraw guilty of two counts of theft of
computer services in Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division. 4
Prior to sentencing, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss the two counts of theft because the facts stated did not consti
tute an offense against the state; thus, the court had no jurisdiction. S
Additionally, the evidence brought to trial did not constitute such an
offense as found in the two counts of theft. 6 Subsequently, the State
appealed to the Court of Appeals of Indiana. 7
The defendant was charged with a number of offenses, of which
the two counts of theft have relevance in the appellate level opinion. 8
From January, 1980, until March, 1981, the Indianapolis Department
of Planning and Zoning employed McGraw as a computer operator
and he used a city computer in his private business of selling Natur
Slim, a dietary product. 9 When the city discharged McGraw, he
asked a colleague to obtain a print-out of the NaturSlim information
1. 459 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. App. Ct. 1984).
2. IND. CoDE ANN. § 35-43-4-2(a) (Burns 1974 & 1984 Supp.).
3. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d at 65.
4. Id. at 62.
5. Id at 62-63.
6. Id. at 63.
7. Id.
8. Id at 62. The two identical counts charged that the defendant "did unlawfully
and knowingly exert unauthorized control over property belonging to the City of Indianap
olis" and used the computer with the intent to deprive the city of something of value, a
portion of the computer's services. Id
9. Id. The city leased computer service from Marion County to be used by city
departments: the defendant's terminal was in the City-County building. McGraw used the
computer for client lists, inventory control, client birthdates, client and potential client
823
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and then remove the data from the computer's memory.lO Instead of
doing so, the colleague informed his supervisor. The investigation that
followed revealed McGraw's unauthorized activities, overwhelmingly
evidenced by the print-out which consisted of a sheaf of papers four
inches to five inches thick, eleven inches wide, and fifteen inches
10ng. 11
II.

ANALYSIS

The appellate court relied heavily on Indiana statutes defining
theft and property in its analysis and decision. The legislature defined
theft as follows:
A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized con
trol over property of another person, with intent to deprive the
other person of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class D
felony. 12

Further, it defined property as:
anything of value; and includ[ing] a gain or advantage or anything
that might reasonably be regarded as such by the beneficiary; real
property, personal property, money, labor, and services; intangibles;
commercial instruments; written instruments concerning labor,
services, or property; written instruments otherwise of value to the
owner, such as a public record, deed, will, credit card, or letter of
credit; a signature to a written instrument; extension of credit, trade
secrets; contract rights, choses-in-action, and other interests in or
claims to wealth; electricity, gas, oil, and water; captured or domes
tic animals, birds, and fish; food and drink; and human remains. 13

To reinstate the conviction against the defendant, the appellate
court had to find that his actions fell within the statutory definitions of
theft and property. McGraw had asserted that under the statutes the
charges against him could not stand, basing his argument on four fac
tors.14 First, he argued that because the theft statute is divided into a
conduct portion and an intent portion and the word "use" does not
appear in the conduct portion, the unauthorized control must be over
the property itself.15 Second, he asserted that the property statute
correspondence, and other business materials. Further, he had been reprimanded for sell
ing NaturSlim on city time, a factor in his ultimate dismissal. Id. at 62-63.
10. /d. at 63.
11. Id. The print-out constituted the tangible result of the alleged theft.
12. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-2(a) (Burns 1974 and 1984 Supp.).
13. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-2 (Burns 1979) (repealed 1983).
14. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d at 63.
15. Id. at 63.
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does not employ the word "use" as such and that the theft statute,
which speaks of control over property, does not include the word
"use."16 Further, McGraw claimed that the term "services" in the
property statute applies only in the context of labor.l7 Finally, Mc
Graw stated that his conduct was not specifically prohibited by stat
ute, that the city could use the computer while he did,18 that the value
of the services he used were minimal, and that his activities parallelled
personal use of an office phone, calculator, or copy machine. 19 He
argued that the city could not claim to have been deprived of use of
the computer unless he had overloaded the memory with his personal
data, or if he had interfered with the city's use.
Because clearly McGraw knowingly and intentionally used the
city's computer for his own personal business use, the issue narrowed
to whether the "use" of computer time constitutes property subject to
theft.20 The courts have not widely addressed the issue; thus the
Court of Appeals of Indiana faced a case of first impression. 21 Look
ing to any possible source, the court found that the defendant relied
too heavily on common law concepts that no longer apply to modem
statutes and that establish much broader definitions of "theft" and
"property."22 The court found only one applicable case within its ju
risdiction. 23 Although Moser v. State 24 deals with cable television
services, it nevertheless indicated that the court defined property more
broadly than McGraw. 2s The Moser court found that cable television
services equalled something of value whether categorized as a service,
a signal, or both. 26 In addition, a decade earlier, the appellate court
had found in Helvey v. Wabash County REMC27 that electricity may
be subject to theft.28 Both Moser and Helvey exhibited the willingness
of the Court of Appeals of Indiana to interpret the property statute
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 63-64.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 64.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 64-65.
23. Id. at 64.
24. 433 N.E.2d 68 (1982). The defendant was charged with using cable television
services without paying for them, an offense covered by IND. CoDE ANN. 35-43-5-3(a)(5)
(Burns Supp. 1984). Moser, 433 N.E.2d at 68 n.1.
25. Moser, 433 N.E.2d at 70.
26. Id. at 71.
27. 151 Ind. App. 176,278 N.E.2d 608 (1972), citing IND. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-66-3
(Burns 1971).
28. Helvey, 151 Ind. App. at 179,278 N.E.2d at 610.
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more broadly than McGraw would have preferred. The court in Mc
Graw followed, finding that a theft of property had occurred. 29 The
McGraw court's interpretation is practical because computers and
cable television are found everywhere and protection against the theft
of their services becomes an increasingly more important issue.
Several cases in other jurisdictions shed light on the McGraw situ
ation and gave support to the McGraw court's decision. 30 First, a
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found in Hancock v. State 3l that
property in a theft could include "all writings of every description,
provided such property possesses any ascertainable value. "32 Property
subject to theft, therefore, could include the computer services and
time that McGraw used without authorization for his personal busi
ness gain. Thus, under the Texas statute in Hancock, McGraw's ac
tions would constitute theft of property.
Further, such support was found in a more recent Alabama case,
National Surety Corp. v. Applied Systems, Inc. 33 Allied Systems was
charged with conversion of computer programs dealing with the pay
roll systems of some of its clients. 34 Although the defendants claimed
that only tangible personal property is subject to the offense of conver
sion,3s the court found that case law existed which holds that intangi
ble personal property can indeed be the subject of larceny.36
Additionally, the Alabama court stated that it would be "inconsistent"
to find that intangible personal property could be subject to theft and
yet not be subject to the offense of conversion. 37 The court's analysis
lent support to the Indiana court's decision that intangibles such as the
use of computer services were property subject to theft.38 Further, at
least one tangible item had been stolen: the computer print-out of Mc
Graw's customer data. 39 The court, therefore, could find that Mc
Graw subjected both tangible and intangible property to theft.
Further support appears in a recent Virginia Supreme Court deci
29. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d at 65.
30. Id. at 64-65.
31. 402 S.W.2d 906 (TEX. CRIM. App. 1966). In Hancock, an employee of a com
puter corporation was implicated in the theft of computer programs. Id. at 907.
32. Id. at 908 quoting TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 1418 (Vernon 1974).
33. 418 So.2d 847 (Ala. 1982).
34. Id. at 848.
35. Id. at 849.
36. Id. at 850. See Latham v. State, 56 Ala. App. 234, 320 So.2d 747 (1975); Han
cock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1121 (1968).
37. National Surety Corp., 418 So.2d at 850.
38. McGraw, 459 N.e.2d at 65.
39. Id. at 63.
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sion, Evans v. Commonwealth. 40 Although the McGraw court did not
cite Evans,41 the case does bolster the McGraw court's position in that
it found that the unauthorized taking of a computer print-out of a
valuable customer list constituted petit larceny.42 Although the fac
tual similarities of McGraw and Evans are not numerous, the Evans
opinion supports the concept that the unauthorized taking of a com
puter print-out constitutes theft.
Case law in some jurisdictions exists that would lead to an oppo
site result from the McGraw decision. 43 The cases, however, are based
upon more restrictive statutes than the Illinois statute with which the
McGraw court dealt. 44 In People v. Weg,4S for example, the court
found the applicable New York statute46 to apply only to unauthor
ized use of equipment offered for use in a commercial setting, such as
leasing or hiring. 47 Further, the legislature did not intend the statute
to make an employee's unauthorized use of office equipment a criminal
offense. 48 Under the New York statute, persons commit a theft of
services when they have unauthorized control of another party's busi
ness, commercial, or industrial equipment and use the control for their
own personal service. 49 In Weg, the computer was definitely not com
mercial or industrial in nature; it belonged to a public school district. so
Additionally, if "business equipment" included any equipment serving
a function for the owner, as the prosecution proposed, all persons who
made unauthorized use of their employers' computers, telephones, or
typewriters would be commiting a criminal offense. s1 Due to the re
stricted language and nature of the statute, however, at least some un
authorized use of computer services would be tolerated. The
unauthorized use of a computer would not be considered criminal be
havior unless the equipment were commercial, industrial, or business
40. - Va. -, 308 S.E.2d 126 (1983).
41. This is most likely due to the fact that the Evans case was decided only three
months before the McGraw opinion was written.
42. - Va. at -, 308 S.E.2d at 129. In Evans, two employees of a bank resigned and
began working for a competitor, taking with them a print-out belonging to the first bank.
The second bank valued the print-out because it contained information concerning the first
bank. - Va. at -, 308 S.E.2d at 127-28, 129.
43. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d at 64.
44. Id. The applicable Indiana statutes do appear to be rather broad.
45. 113 Misc. 2d 1017,450 N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982).
46. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15, subd. 8. (McKinney Supp. 1984).
47. Weg, 113 Misc. 2d at 1019-20, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
48. Id. at 1020,450 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
49. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15, subd. 8. (McKinney Supp. 1984).
50. Weg, 113 Misc. 2d at 1019, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
51. Id. at 1023, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
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equipment. 52
A similar holding is found in Lund v. Commonwealth 53 in which
the applicable statute defined grand larceny as the taking from another
party money or another thing of value of five dollars or more, or the
taking from the possession of another, goods and chattels of at least
$100 in value. 54 Because criminal statutes must be strictly construed
to protect the rights and liberties of citizens, the unauthorized use of
computer time cannot be construed as the taking of goods or chat
tels. 55 "Goods and chattels"· imply that something tangible IS m
volved, and the use of a computer is intangible.

III.

CONCLUSION

The most recent case law is not definitive as to the taking of com
puter services. Because computers are becoming more and more com
monplace, the problem of takings will become more prevalent. We
can infer that judicial indecision invites legislative reform. Statutes
applicable to computer services theft are not uniform, nor do they lead
to predictable results. Further, because many of the statutes deal with
theft in general, the courts face the task of interpreting and applying
laws to situations never intended by lawmakers, again leading to non
uniform, unpredictable results. The problems will be alleviated as
more states choose to enact specific computer service theft statutes.
Ann C Hansen

52.
53.
54.
55.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15, subd. S. (McKinney SUpp. 1984).
217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977).
VA. CoDE § IS.1-100 (1950), 1960 VA. Acrs c. 358.
Lund, 217 Va. at 692, 232 S.E.2d at 74S.

